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ABSTRACT
This paper develops a method for joint estimation of both the degree of internal returns to scale
and the extent of external economies. We apply the method in estimating returns to scale indexes
for U.S. manufacturing industries at the two-digit level.Overall, we find that only three of the
twentyindustry categories show any evidence of internal increasing returns: (1) Primary Metals, (2)
Electrical Machinery, and (3) Paper Products. More striking, however, is the very strong evidence
of the existence of external economies, where external is defined as external to a given two-digit
industry and internal to the U.S..According to our preferred estimates, if allmanufacturing
industries simultaneously raise their inputs by 10%, aggregate manufacturing production rises by
13%, of which about 5% is du to external economies. Thus, when an industry increases its inputs
in isolation by 10%, its output rises by no more than 8%.
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Both in the strict sense and in a figurative sense, external economies have been the drivingforcebe-
hind a considerable body of recent theoretical work.' As yet, however, the corresponding empirical
literature lags behind. This paper addresses that lag. The central innovation is the development
of a method for joint estimation of both the degree of internal returns to scale and the extent of
external economies. We apply the method in estimating returns to scale indexes for U.S. manufac-
turing industries at the two-digit level. Overall, we find very little evidence of internal increasing
returns. Of the twenty industry categories only three show any evidence of internal economies.
More striking, however, is the very strong evidence of the existence of external economies, where
external is defined as external to a given two-digit industry and internal to the U.S.. That is, for
a given input level, an industry's output is significantly higher on averagewhen output of other
manufacturing industries is high.
The starting point for our modelling approach draws heavily on Hall's ingenious work (1988a.
1988b), in which he estimated indexes of returns to scale, y, and monopolistic competition. i,
forU.S. industry. Hs approach, however, is not aimed at capturing the potential role of external
economies in production. In fact, if his measured -y is interpreted as the elasticity of industry output
with respect to total industry's input then the estimate is upward-biased when external economies
are present (given the positive correlation between industry inputs and aggregateinputs2).In
response to this issue, we develop a model which successfully discriminates between the two types
of scale effects. Aggregation is explicitly dealt with in order to determine how external economies
become internal as the aggregation level rises.In the end, our point estimates for the degree of
internal returns to scale at the two-digit level suggest that increasing returns are both much more
muted and much less prevalent than Hall's point estimates, when misinterpreted, suggested. The
difference is principally attributable to the general significance of external economies.
In the paper we present a number of different estimating procedures and specifications. With
respect to the estimating procedures, before proceeding we explicitly consider the bias and efficiency
tradeoffs of instrumental and non-instrumental variable procedures.Although in the end the
magnitudes of the estimates do depend on the estimation technique used, the main conclusions do
not: The evidence points in the direction of constant or decreasing returns to scale at the two-digit
level, with an important external economy that lifts the returns to scale index at the one-digit level
above one. According to our preferred estimates, if all manufacturing industries simultaneously
See, for example, Ethier (1982), Rorner (1986), and Lucas (1988). -
2InHall's case, the source of upward bias is the correlation between aggregate demand instru-
ments and external economies.
2raise their inputs by 10%,aggregatemanufacturing value added rises by 13%, of which about 5%
is due to external economies. Thus, when an industry increases its inputs in isolation by 10%, its
value added rises by no more than 8%.
The theoretical literature on the distinction between internal and external economies dates
back to Marshall (1920). The distinction is fundamental since the role of increasing returns cannot
be dealt with unless their nature is specified, given their very different implications for firm behav-
ior. In his text Marshall provided two examples of external effects. The first is an increase in "trade
knowledge" that cannot be kept secret. The second is based on subsidiary trades that use what
he referred to as "machinery of the most highly specialized character." This notion harks back to
Adam Smith's emphasis on efficient division of labor and the benefits of increased specialization
[see also Young (1928)].
Once the idea of an externality was formalized by Meade (1952) and the existence of a consis-
tent, competitive equilibrium with externalities demonstrated by Chipman (1970), it was clear that
Marshall's concept could be rigorously justified. It is now widely accepted that, for example, the
inclusion of knowledge as an input to production can lead to increasing returns and that spillovers
of knowledge between firms can be treated as externalities because protection of proprietary infor-
ination is incomplete [see, e.g., Arrow (1962) and Rorner (1986)].
For many years, Marshall's concept of increasing returns that are external to a firm but internal
to an industry, or the economy as a whole, was most widely used in static models, especially in the
field of international trade [see Helprnan (1984) for a discussion of the use of this framework in trade
models].5 The sources for the external effects in these models include advantages of within industry
specialization, conglomeration, indivisibilities, and public intermediate inputs such as roads. More
relevant for our work than the external to the firm/internal to the industry distinction, however, is
the theoretical work that considers inter-industry externalities, since our unit of empirical analysis
is the two-digit level industry. Recent work in this area includes Manning and Macmillan (1979),
Chang (1981), and Herberg, Kemp, and Tawada (1982). The latter article, for example, considers
the effect of (unspecified) inter-industry externalities on the traditional Stolper-Samuelson and
Also see Lucas (1988) for a model with constant returns to scale at the firm level and exter-
nalities due to human capital accumulation.
Our procedure is designed to detect technological externalities, as opposed to the pecuniary
externalities discussed, for example, in Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1988). Note, however, that
most of their arguments could be rephrased in terms of technological externalities.
The area of Urban Economics has also frequently made use of Marshall's notion of external
economies. For an example of an application of "agglomeration externalities" in a model of the
formation of cities see Papageorgiou and Smith (1983).
3Rybczynski theorems, among other issues.The authors find that the conclusions from these
theorems can only be derived under certain conditions, which typically include non-positive inter-
industrial effects.
Of particular interest to Macroeconornists is the fact that the presence of (positive) external
economies imparts distinctive characteristics to an economy. For example, business cycle fluctu-
ations are likely to be wider, as co-movements generate important reinforcing cross effects.Fur-
thermore, it is now well known that external effects with positive feedback provides fertile ground
for multiple equilibria [see Diamond (1982)1.
The rest of the paper is divided into five sections and two appendices. Section II lays out
the method in detail and outlines our approach for discriminating between internal and external
economies; section III describes the data; section IV presents the analysis of potential bias from
not using instrumental variables and the specification test results; section V presents the results
for the indexes of returns to scale and external economies; and section VI provides our conclusions.
Appendices A and B present extensions and discuss their effects on our parameter estimates.
II. METHOD
11.1. The Basic Model
Consider the following value added function which treats both external economies and technological
progress explicitly:
Y =F(K,L,E,V),
where Y, K, L, E and V are value added, capital, labor, an external economy index and a
productivity index, respectively. Furthermore, assume F is homogeneous of degree 7(t)incapital
and labor, of degree one in the productivity index, and of degree one in the external effects index.6
Letting x =logXand F = weget the total differential:
dy=(.dk+ ()d1+ ()de+ (f)dv.
Given the homogeneity properties of F(),wehave:
IFKK\IFLL 7(i)= +—i:;--




Replacing these conditions in (1) yields:
(2) dy= 7(t)dk + () (dl—dk) + de + dv.
Under the very strong assumption that conditions faced by firms are such that their dynamic
optimization problem can be well approximated by a sequence of frictionless static problems. it
is possible to obtain a simple expression for (E), since the first order condition with respect to
labor of a profit maximizing firm with some degree of monopoly power in the goods but not in the
factor markets is:
where P, W and iarethe value added price, wage and elasticity of demand (absolute value),
respectively.
A firm with monopoly power will set its price such that P/MC = whereMCdenotes
marginal cost. Defining the markup coefficient as (t)P/AIC yields:
(3) (f)=
wherea,(t) is the share of labor in value added.
Replacing (3) in (2) results in:
(4) dy= 7(t)dk + z(t)a,(t)(dL— dk) + de + dv.
Thisequation establishes the percent change in output as the sum of four different components.
The first is the product of the elastidty of output with respect to total input and the percent change
in capital. The second is the elasticity of output with respect to labor, which equals 7(t)c(t),
times the change in the labor/capital ratio. Finally, de is the external effect and dv is the percent
change in the productivity index.
Excluding the external economy term, Hall's (1988a) formulation corresponds to the case in
which 7(t) =1,whereas Hall's (1988b) model is obtained by recognizing that F(.,., .)'s homogeneity




5where r and PK are the real (rental) cost of capital and price of capital, respectively.
If a() denotes labor's share in total factor costs, equation (5) implies:
a0(i) =
hence
dy =[a()dI + (1 —a(t))dk]+ dw,
where dwde + dv. This is the first estimating equation of this paper (with the coefficient y
assumed time invariant). As discussed above, it matches Hall's (1988b) formulation. It establishes
the percent change in output as the weighted percent changes in inputs, multiplied by the returns
to scale index y, plus some non-observable. The weights for the inputs are the corresponding
cost shares. Some intuition for the appropriate weights being the cost shares comes from cost
minimization. Consider a slight substitution of! for k at the marginal rate of technical substitution
(i.e., such that dy =0).Given factor prices, the percent rise in the total labor bill equals dl and
the percent fall in the total capital bill equals dk. The only way these (typically) different percent
changes can result in no change in total cost is to weight them by their corresponding cost shares.
Thus, {a()d1 + (1 —a())dk]=0when [F,dI + Fkdk] =0.These two expressions establish a
clear link between the cost share and the corresponding marginal product.
The formulation above, however, fails to recognize a potentially very important consideration.
The next section shows that when the unobservable includes an external economy component the
estimates of y do not in general represent the degree of homogeneity of the production function
with respect to capital and labor, but a combination of this homogeneity and external economies.
611.2. Internal vs. External Economies
11.2.1. General Model
Consider a model in which total value added can be divided into a continuum of sectors indexed
by jE[0, 1], with shares of total value added equal to S. In the same way, sectors are formed
by a continuum of industries indexed by i E [0, 1], with shares of sector j's value added equal to
bj. Finally, each industry is divided into a continuum of firms indexed by h(O 1], with shares
of industry ij's value added equal to 6hij• Adopting the notation: -
[adi + (1 —
itis possible to rewrite equatiOn (6) for each firm hij as follows:
(7) dyj,= 7dXh + dehjj + dvhl1,
where for convenience the time index has been dropped andhas, for the time being, been assumed
equal across firms.
Productivity change can be decomposed into orthogonal components, dv, dvi, dv1 and dulhIJ,
hence:
(8) dvhjj =dv+ dv + dv1 + dulhI.
For simplicity external economies can be summarized by linear terms related to higher levels of
output aggregation, so:
(9) deh1filhijdyIj + /32hIJdY + /33hIJdy + du2hI,
where constants have been suppressed for convenience and du2h represents any departure from a
deterministic relationship between aggregate value added and external economies7,
Notice that the "externality" parameters (the 13's) can take either positive or negative val-
ues.The former corresponds to external economies whereas the latter corresponds to external
diseconomies. For simplicity, these parameters will be assumed to be equal across firms, hence
/3lhij= /31h'i'j', =82h'i'j' and/33h1j =133h'i'j'for all h, i,j, h', i',j' E [0, 1].Appendix A
relaxes this assumption.
E.g. a random coefficient model with /3hjj =fi +Whij.
7Replacing (8) and (9) back in (7) yields:
dyhj= ldZhIf +)3ldyJ + 32dy + /33dy + dv + dv3 + dv3 + duhI3,
whereduh13du1h3 +du2h53.Now,multiplying both sides of (10) by 5hij,assumingthat the
production shares are equal to the input shares, and integrating over the support of h, yields
industry ij's estimating equation:
dy,3 = +1.2_dy+j—_dy+ + dv3 + dv11).





Certainly extending this ton levels of aggregation is trivial. The formulas reveal how economies
that are external at one level become internal at higher levels of aggregation. It also reveals that
aggregation does not cause estimation problems as long as the returns to scale estimate is not
interpreted as the firm level returns to scale.Nevertheless, estimating disaggregated equations
disregarding external economies may induce serious biases if the latter are present.The next
subsection develops these ideas in more detail and brings the degree of aggregation andsource of
external economies to a level at which manufacturing forms a complete system by itself.
811.2.2. Manufacturing Model
In this subsection we lay out the main model to be estimated and tested in this paper. We
consider total manufacturing value added as the highest level of aggregation and the two-digit
SIC classification as the lowest level of aggregation. In terms of the model presented above, this
amounts to assuming that ,whichcaptures any effect external to manufacturing as a whole, is
small.8 In addition, the coefficient y estimated here corresponds to the degree of economies of scale
internal to each two-digit industry, and therefore does not necessarily coincide with the degree of
economies of scale at the firm level given that economies external to the firm but internal to the
industry might be present.




where dy represents value added in manufacturing.
As pointed out above, Hall's estimate [i.e., equation (6)] applied to aggregate manufacturing
reflects more than just the average degree of internal returns to scale at the industry level. Given
the degree of homogeneity with respect to capital and labor of technologies at the industry level, as
the degree of external economies (within manufacturing) rises, the 0L59 estimate of 'y in (6) also
rises, reflecting the fact that industry level external effects as specified in our model are internal
to the manufacturing sector as a whole.
On the other hand, when equation (6) is estimated at the industry level, the OLS'° estimate
We did test specifications that admit a potential role for effects external to manufacturing as
a whole. That is, we projected industry output changes on GNP changes, in addition to own input
changes (dxi) and total manufacturing output changes (dy). The resulting coefficient on GNP
changes was typically insignificant. In those cases in which it was significant the overall fit of the
equation was not improved.
Issues of potential correlation between inputs and technological progress are considered in the
next subsection. However, the main arguments also hold for the standard instrumental variables
procedures used in the literature.
Again, potential correlation between inputs and technological progress are postponed until
the next subsection.
9of y, henceforth denoted 8, has a probability limit that in general does not coincide with y:
plim9 =+
where=




anddi, denotes the projection of dx, onto the subspace spanned by the
instruments.
Hence, if industry and total manufacturing inputs are positively correlated (,>0) and
positive external economies are present ($>0), as the results below strongly suggest, 8 is an
(asymptotically) upward biased estimator of y. In fact 8 reflects an interesting concept: If condi-
tional expectations are assumed to be linear in inputs, 9 is a consistent estimator of the expected
percent increase in a given industry's output each time this industry increases its inputs by one
percent. This expectation, however, takes into account the likelihood of simultaneous input use
increases on the rest of the industries. A similar concept applies for the IV estimator.
In contrast, estimation of equation (11) permits a disentangling of internal and external
economies. Given the apparent correlation between dy and dv this requires using instrumental
variables. Fortunately, equation (12) yields the required instrument for dy." The next subsection
describes the estimation procedures.
Do not confuse an instrument for dy with the previous discussion about IV procedures. There,
the question was whether to instrument the dx,'s or not.
1011.3. Testing Procedure
Estimation of equations (11) and (12) has the inconvenience that (unobservable) productivity
growth is likely to be correlated with changes in capital and labor, yielding a classical case of
specification error. Hall noticed this and advocated using an instrumental variable procedure. Al-
though theoretically correct, the lack of good macro-instruments rendered his insightful procedure
powerless. The reason to worry about specification error is the inconsistency of parameter esti-
mates. However the magxiitude of this asymptotic bias decreases with the size of the variance of
the regressors relative to their covariance with thanges in productivity growth. if the latter is small
relative to the former, there is no need to forgo the relative power of OLS or SUR procedures (i.e.,
relative to IV with instruments mildly correlated with regressors). Furthermore, the same reason-
ing shows that a very small correlation between instruments and changes in productivity growth
may prove much more problematic than the OLS or SURbiases since the covariance between in-
struments and regressors is likely to be far smaller than the variance of thelatter11. Section IV
presents Hausman's specification tests and provides an example to illustrate the tradeoffsinvolved.
A different issue arises in estimating equation (12) even when inputs and technologica' progress
innovations are "nearly" independent, since dy and dv are obviously correlated. A 3SLS procedure
in which all the xi's are used as instruments is feasible; however, the shortage of observations leaves
very few degrees of freedom in the first stage regression.A more appealing procedure12 is to use
the restricted reduced form in the first stage.In fact the latter is given by equation (12). An
equivalent procedure is to just replace equation (12) in (11), yielding;
dy1 =-ydx+
or
(14) dy =dx1+ ,cdx + + du..
The parameter K represents the external economy in terms of aggregate inputs. Given estimate
of K andit is easy to recover the parameter 3. Also notice that if manufacturing inputs rather
than manufacturing value added is the appropriate externality index (e.g. Romer 1988), so that
de, =Adx+ du2, K captures the magnitude of this external economy aswell. In fact our model
cannot tell these two stories apart.
Notice that these are all large sample arguments. See Nelson and Startz (1988a, lQSSb) for
very compelling reasons in the smallsample context to prefer OLS procedures over IV with poor
first stage regression properties.
12 Obviously, this is only a small sample issue.
11III. DATA
The data used are the same as those used in Hall (1988a, 1988b) and were obtained from Hail.
They cover seven one-digit industry groups and the twenty two-digit manufacturing industries for
the years 1953-1980. The series we use include: Y: real value added in 1982 dollars [U.S. National
Income and Product Accounts (NIPA)], K: net real capital stock [Bureau of Economic Analysis],
N: hours of work of all employees [NIPA], and W: total compensation divided by N.
The instrumental variables are (1) the rate of increase of the world dollar price of crude
petroleum, (2) the rate of growth of military purchases of goods and services in real terms, and
(3) a dummy variable with the value of one when the president is a Democrat and zero when he is
a Republican.
We construct the rental price of capital as Hall did, followingHall and Jorgenson (1967). The
rental price is determined as:
1 —c—rd r=(p+b)
1 PK
where p is the firm's real cost of funds, measured as the dividend yield of the S&P 500; 8 is the
economic rate of depreciation, set to 0127 [Jorgenson and Sullivan (1981), Table 1, p.179]; c is
the effective rate of the investment tax credit [Ibid., Table 10, p. 194]; d is the present discounted
value of tax deductions for depreciation [Ibid., Table 6, pp. 188-189]; and PK is the deflator for
business fixed investment [NIPAI.
The standard argument in support of using the dividend yield as the real cost of funds starts
with the observation that most investment in the U.S. is financed through equity in the form
of retained earnings. As long as the dividend yield is a good measure of the cost of equity, its
use is justified. Of course, stocks differ substantially in the share of their total yield that comes
from dividends versus capital gains. The argument is that on balance the dividend yield is an
accurate measure. The principal alternative is to derive an estimated real rate from some measure
of expected or realized inflation and a nominal rate of interest. As it turns out, in Caballero and
Lyons (1989) we found that the results in this context are quite robust to the choice of measures.
12IV. BIAS ANALYSIS AND SPECIFICATION TESTS
Rightly so,Hall(1988a, 1988b) argues that the returns to scale parameter, 7, is not identified
since the changes in inputs are not predetermined with respect to shocks that shift the production
function.Unfortunately, instruments that are likely to be uncorrelated with technology shocks
are seldom highly correlated with the right hand side variables. Nelson and Startz(1988a, t988b)
showed that when this poor first-stage regression property is accompanied by a small sample, as
is certainly true in our case, instrumental variable procedures are potentially more biased than
simpler non-instrumental variable approaches.
Unfortunately, these are small sample issues and as such do not have a clear theoretical
resolution'3. Should one use the asymptotically correct but poorly behaved (in small samples) IV
estimator14, or the inconsistent but better behaved (in small samples) non-IV procedures? Given
that this is an open question we present both sets of estimates. We show below, nonetheless, that
non-IV procedures are probably not subject to substantial asymptotic biases. Furthermore, the
large gains in the precision with which the parameters of primary concern are estimated wake us
lean towards non-IV methods. These are the ones we emphasize throughout the paper.
Vie first use an example to illustrate that the cost of disregarding the potential correlation
between productivity growth and the explanatory variables in terms of asymptotic bias is indeed
likely to be small. For this example, let us specialize F(.,.,.,.) to a Cobb-Douglas technology. Let
us also assume that the demand conditions are such that the mark-upcoefficient, z, is constant15
and equal to 1.6. Wages, capital costs, demand and productivity growth are assumed to be driven
by independent random variables'6.Both demand and productivity shocks have idiosyncratic
(industry-specific) and aggregate components. Assuming that labor's cost share is 0.75, and taking
the conservative approach that all shocks but those to wages and capital costs have the same degree
of uncertainty (wages and capital costs are assumed to have a standard deviation twice as large
as that of other shocks), it is possible to construct "reasonable" bounds forthe potential bias of
OLS estimates (i.e., when the possible correlation between regressors and productivity growth is
disregarded).
13 At least there is no clear resolution known to us.
By IV estimator we mean the estimates generated by an instrumental variables procedure in
which the instruments are poorly correlated with the regressors.
15E.g. an isoelastic demand function.
16 Some of the independence assumptions are more questionable than others. For example factor
price uncertainty is likely to be positively correlated with technology and demand shocks, especially
if they are not industry-specific. Under the parametric assumptions made here, however, these
assumptions can be relaxed (within "reasonable" margins) without altering results by much.
13o' 1 piim(—=
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Figuresla and lb report the bias involved in OLS estimation for different true values of 7 and
3. The vertical axes measure the size of the biases and the horizontal axes specify the corresponding
value of ,theexternal economy parameter. The two figures differ only in the true parameter 7
assumed. The support of these figures suggests that the biases are never very 1arge. For example,
Especially when compared with the estimated coefficients and standard errors. This holds a
fortiori when one considers the standard errors that result when the parameters are estimated with
poor macro-instruments.
14if -y =1.0and fi= 0.3,the asymptotic bias of OLS estimates are: 0.016 for fi,0.004for 'y, 0.039
for Kand0.04 for .Allof these are negligible numbers when compared with the true parameter
values.
The next step is to provide a statistical metric for the importance of these biases. Hausman's
test is particularly suitable for this purpose. This test relies on the comparison of the parameter
of primary concern yielded by two alternative procedures leading to consistent estimates under the
null hypothesis (no specification error) and diverging under the alternative. Calland 2 these
estimates, then Hausman's test is:
()T+(_$2)
whereV(x)+ denotes the generalized inverse of the variance-covariance matrix of the vector x, and
i'isthe transpose of x,
Under the null hypothesis this statistic is distributed x2 with degrees of freedom equal to
the rank of the variance-covariance matrix. Most of the complications come from calculating the
variance-covariance matrix. Two notable exceptions are the case in which one of the estimators
is relatively efficient and the case in which both sets of estimates are uncorrelated. In the former
an asymptotic version of Rao-Blackwell's Theorem applies, yielding the variance of the difference
equal to the difference of the variances (Hausman 1978). In the latter, the variance of the difference
is equal to the sum of the variances (e.g. Hausman and Taylor 1982).
Table 1 presents the x2 statistics of Hausman's tests comparing OLS versus SUIt estimates,
and 35LS18 versus SUIt estimates19 for equation (14).The evidence from the tests is mixed:
The first case yields a very low value for Hausman's statistic, suggesting no substantial problems
due to the potential correlation between changes in productivity growth and the regressors. The
second, on the other hand, reflects a very strong rejection of the no-misspecification hypothesis.
Once more, the tradeoffs discussed above do not permit a clear answer.Despite the fact that
the variance-covariance matrix of cross equation disturbances is nowhere near diagonal, the first
By 3SLS we mean an instrumental variable procedure that takes into account the covariances
between cross equation disturbances. The instrumental variables used are (1) the rate of increase of
the world price of crude petroleum in dollars, (2) the rate of growth of military purchases of goods
and services in real terms, and (3) a dummy variable with the value of one when the president is
a Democrat and zero when he is a Republican. The performance of these instruments is further
discussed in Hall (1988b).
19Bothof these sets of tests correspond to the first of the exceptions mentioned above, in which
Hausman's test takes a simple form.
15test may suffer from low power. And while the second test is likely to be more powerful, it is
not immune to criticisms along the lines of those introduced by Nelson and Startz vis-a-vis the
small sample properties of the i-statistic when poor instruments are used.It does not seem too
farfetched to conjecture that in this context, given the weak correlation between the instruments
and regressors, the small sample distribution of Hausman's statistic is quite far from thestandard
x2distribution.Nevertheless, given these ambiguities, hereafter we report both sets of estimates.
though we emphasize the non-IV procedures.
V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
V.1. Aggregate Manufacturing
Table 2 presents both OLS and IV results for equation (6) at the level of aggregate manufacturing
(constant not shown). The sample extends from 1953 to 1980.According to the model, the
coefficient represents the elasticity of output with respect to simultaneous proportional changes in
K and L. We denote the coefficient asrather than y since the presence of external economies calls
for the model described by equation (12) in which this coefficient is shown to represent 71(1 —
wherefi captures the external (to the two-digit industries) economies andreflects the average
degree of internal returns to scale at the industry level.
On the whole the equation fits well under both methods of estimation, although the precision
of the coefficient is much higher using 0LS20. While the IV estimate is larger, only the OLS
estimate is significantly greater than one, suggesting the presence of increasing returns to scale at
the aggregate manufacturing level.It is not clear from this coefficient, however, to what degree
external returns are present. As section 11.2. demonstrates, whenis interpreted as a measure
of internal returns to scale at the two-digit level it includes an upward bias if external economies
are present21. To determine whether this is the case we now turn to the two-digit industry level
results.
20Thereis no evidence of serial correlation from either the Durbin-Watson statistic or the Ljung-
Box Qstatistic.
21ifexternal diseconomies prevailed the sign of the bias would be reversed.
16V.2. Internal vs. External Economies: The Constrained Model
To provide an overview of the results that follow, Table 3 presents estimates of the models with all
industry coefficients constrained equal. The table presents the SUR and 3SLS results for both the
model described in equation (6) (first row) and the richer model described in equation (14) which
discriminates between internal and external effects (rows 2-5). The marginal significance levels of
various tests of the constraints appear in rows 6 through 9.
Row I of the table provides an individuad two-digit industry estimate of the composite measure
of returns to scale from equation (6), denoted here (at the industry level) as 9. The coefficients are
both very precisely estimated. While the 3SLS estimate is significantly greater than one, the STIR
estimate is on the borderline. Economically, however, the SUR estimate is right at one. Given that
we view this as the better measure of the two, we find this very encouraging in light of the fact
that so much of the literature finds something close to constant returns to scale at the industry
level22. Row 6 provides the marginal significance of the test that the 8's are in fact equal across
all industries in each country. The more powerful SUR test rejects the constraint with a marginal
significance at 2 percent. The individual industry 9's are presented in the next section.
Rows 2 through 5 provide estimates relevant for isolating the role of intra-U.S. external effects.
Row 2 presents the arithmetic mean of the estimated tb's and 'j1's, two of the parameters that
govern the wedge between 9 andwhere '= andtb1,=Cdi Thus,there exists
on average considerable positive covariance between industry input and aggregate input levels23.
Rows 3 and 4 present the estimates of the internal elasticities of output with respect to K and
L and the role of external economies as captured by icRow 5 reports the values for /3 implied
by the estimates of tc. Note that the disentangled coefficients are also very sharply estimated. In
neither case is 7 significantly greater than one. The external economy parameter is positive and
very significant.External economies are clearly present. Moreover, the fact that the aggregate
estimates of(Table 2) are significantly larger than the estimates of 7 at the industry level, as
well as the fact that 9 is between these two estimates24, is fully consistent with equations (11) and
(12), confirming further the presence of external economies and the propriety of the model. In
sum, the data appear to speak quite clearly as to the extent and nature (i.e., internal vs. external)
of returns to scale at the macro level in the United States.
Row 7 presents the marginal significance levels of the tests that the external returns parameters
22 See, for example, the survey by Walters (1963).
23 Both when projected onto the instruments subspace and when not projected.
24 As it should be according to equation (12) when fi> 0and 0 <1'<1.In fact plimO can be
written as pUmO =0 +(— 1)70/U—
17are equal across all industries. The constraint cannot be rejected at conventional significance levels
for either method of estimation. Rows 8 and 9 provide marginal significance levels for tests of the
-constraintacross industries. The more powerful SUR test rejects in both cases.
V.3. Internal vs. External Economies: The Industry Estimates
We now turn to individual two-digit industry results. Table 4 presents the coefficients from esti-
mation of equation (14) with the external effects parameter 3, hence Ic,constrainedequal across
all sectors25.(RecallfromTable 3 that this constraint wastheonly one that was not rejected
for either estimation method.) For both procedures the constrained Ic, representing the external
effects, is positive and very significant. Moreover, the size of the coefficient is quite similar to that
in the case where both pc andare constrained equal across sectors (Table 3). On the whole,
the measured 's are positive, significant, much more tightly estimated using SUR, slightly higher
using 3SLS, and predominantly lower than one. Of the STIR estimates, five of the twenty industries
show a coefficient that is not significantly greater than zero, with Food Products as the egregious
outlier on the low end. On the high end, across the two estimation methods only three industries
show significant evidence of internal increasing returns: (1) Primary Metals, (2) Paper Products,
and (3) Electrical Machinery. TheSU11procedure has enough power to indicate that 15 of the 20
two-digit industries exhibit decreasing returns to scale. Overall, the model appears to fit the U.S.
two-digit data quite well.
The most prominent feature of the above results is the clear statistical signiftcance of the
external economies parameter. In considering the economic signiiicance ofits magnitude, perhaps it
is most informative to calculate the output effect for an industry that expands independently versus
expanding in concert with all other (manufacturing) industries. Consider the following example
which uses parameter values in the middle range of the estimated coefficients. An industry with a
-equalto 0.8 and a Kequalto 0.5 increases its total inputs by 10 percent. If all industries act in
concert then the added output is 13 percent, as opposed to the 8 percent that results if the industry
acts alone (assuming this industry is too small to significantly affect the aggregate). Of course, this
comparison considers two polar extremes that are in themselves not very realistic. Nonetheless,
even for far less extreme comparisons the differential output effects of external economies are not
trivial.
Table 5 presents the industry level results from estimation of equation (6). These 9's corre-
spond to the composite returns to scale measure estimated by Hall (1988b). As with the -y's in
25Natethat the y/(1 —) termin Iccorrespondsto the aggregate coefficient; hence itis the
same for all sectors.
18Table 4, on the whole they are positive, significant, much more tightly estimated using StIR, and
higher using 3SLS. The prominent sectors on the low end and the high end are much the same as
those from Table 4. For each industry, the parameters & and governthe unconditional change
in output for a given change in industry input (ven the industry's K):thehigher are t/'andtb,
the higher the expected output response to a given change in industry input. The mean & and
are 0.79 and 0.68, respectively, as reported in Table 3. Finally, it is important to notice that of the
forty returns to scale estimates reported in tables 4 and 5 only one (sector 21's IV estimate) fails
to satisfy the sign of the difference (9 —y)implied by our model. This represents strong support
for the external economy hypothesis.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Our evidence for the presence of external economies stands in sharp relief.Irrespective of the
method of estimation, external economies are both statistically and economically very significant.
At the same time, we find no evidence of internal increasing returns in over four-fifths of the
twenty two-digit industries. In short, the model we develop for disentangling internal and external
economies meets the approval of the data. Expressed compactly, our preferred model says that the
elasticity of an industry's output with respect to own input, holding the input of other industries
constant, is about 0.8.Thiselasticity rises to 1.3 when industry inputs move in lockstep.Of
course, the unconditional elasticity falls somewhere between these two extremes. According to our
estimates it is in the neighborhood of 1.0.
We also argue and present evidence as to why the usual instrumental variable procedures,
with the attendant dismal macro instruments, may not be the appropriate choice in the context
of Hall's (1988b) procedures, given that our main concern is parameter estimation. The results of
Hausman tests designed to detect the potential misspecification are mixed. In the end, although
we prefer the non-IV estimation, we present results for both methods. More important, the spirit
of the results is invariant to which method is used.
It should be noted that there is no sense in which our efforts have been misguided by looking
for external effects at the two-digit level. To be sure, if we had found nothing then it would have
been time to look to the less aggregated data for external effects that are fully internalized at lower
levels.In fact, we view our results as all the more striking in that they highlight the fact that
economically quite large external effects are not wholly internalized even at the two-digit level. It
is of course possible that there exist effects external to firms but internal to, say, four-digit level
industries that are ultimately reflected in our composite 's at the two-digit level.This is not
a problem. One should simply be reminded that it would be improper to interpret our 's as
19measures of interna.l returns to scale at less aggregated levels.
Our level of aggregation also jibes with much of the theoretical work in the area.For ex-
ample, Romer's (1986) celebrated growth model, in which knowledge spillovers generate external
economies, is typically couched in terms of firm level production versus aggregate production.
What matters for his results, however, is that the externality lies somewhere between the firm
and the aggregate. Thus, our results are fully consistent with his, and might be interpreted as
providing some evidence in support of his framework26.
Finally, a comparison with European industry is possible since Caballero and Lyons (1989)
apply the method developed here to European manufacturing at the NACE two-digit level. The
bottom line there is very similar to that in the U.S.. The external economies coefficients (ic's) for
the four countries covered by the study are all very significant. Two of the four are higher than in
the U.S. (France at 1.40 and Belgium at O.68 and two arelower(Germany at 0.32 and the U.K.
at 0.29). Moreover, as in the U.S., there is very little evidence of internal increasing returns in
Europe.
26Strictlyspeaking, however, we cannot rule out the possibility of increasing returns at the firm
level, since external diseconomiesmaybe present at levels between the firm and the two-digit level.
20APPENDIX A
This appendix discusses the potential bias involved with the assumptions of equal 3's and s
across sectors. For this let us write a generalized version of equation (11):
dy, =ydx1+ f3dy + dv + du1.
As before, multiplying both sides of (A.1) by ö, the share of industry i in manufacturing value
added (and inputs), and integrating over all i, yields:
(A.2) dy = j y1dx161di + ——dv,
where j3f' öj3 di.
Therefore even if the /3's are different across industries, the aggregate has a simple interpre-
tation in terms of the weighted average of the industry level coefficients. Heterogeneous yj's, on
the other hand, makes the problem more complex.
Define J0'di, then (A.2) can be written as follows:
(A.3) dy =—2—dx+•-dv+—Lj(7.— )dx1ödi.
Equation (A.3) allows us to determine the sign of the bias of the aggregate coefficient ,when
the 7j's are assumed equal across sectors.If, on average, industries that have a higher degree of
returns to scale have more procyclical input demands than firms with a lower degree of returns
to scale, the estimator of 0 is upward biased. The opposite is true if firms with higher 's have
less procyclical input demands than firms with lower 's.Finally, no bias occurs if there is no
systematic relation between the 's and the cyclical behavior of the dx,'s.
From (A.3) it is possible to show, after some simple algebra and assuming that the number of
sectors is large, that:
(A.4) plirn(_.±)= E[(1!_Lz) vi],
where v'jc/c. Several experiments can now be performed. Suppose for instance that the
actual 's and v1's are jointly normally distributed. Estimating the first two moments from our
data yields an asymptotic bias of the above proportion equal to 2.6%.
21APPENDIX B
In thepaperwe have assumed that the dynamic optimization problem of a firm can be well
approximated by a sequence of (annual) frictionless static problems, This appendix shows that
relaxing this assumption to allow for issues like labor hoarding and excess capacity is not likely to
yield substantial biases.
Suppose now that the first order conditions implied by the static optimization problem are
not always satisfied. Furthermore, they need not even be satisfied on average. After some trivial








where) and ) are two positive constants, and z and zk are strictly positive random variab'es
with mean equal to one.
If, for example, ) < 1 there is chronic excess capacity. The random variablezk, on the other
hand, controls short-run excess capacity and/or over-utilization of capital. Analogous examples
can be constructed for labor hoarding.
Following steps identical to those in the paper we obtain an equation parallel to (4):
dy= y(t)dk + — dk) + de + dv.





/ a(t) '\y(t) 1
=r(t)+ a(t)(1 -r(t)))(t) z'(t)
22Plugging this expression back in (B.1), yields:
=7(t)d/c+ (70)+a1—
(dl—dk)+ de + dv.
It is apparent from (B.2) that if r= 1the estimating equation is identical to that of the paper.
In other words, excess capacity and labor hoarding affect the model only if they do not move
proportionally. Hence, the case of proportional excess capacity and labor hoarding (positive or
negative) movements is fully consistent with the procedure pursued in the paper.
Now assume that this is not the case, i.e. risnot always equal to one. To make the formulae
simple, however, let us assume that r is constant, but it takes on very extreme values: when
excess capacity is the dominant feature r =0.5,whereas when labor hoarding dominates r =2.
Furthermore, given that only the order of magnitude of the bias concerns us here, let us disregard
the external effect (alternatively, assume that the firms capital/labor ratio is almost uncorrelated
with aggregate inputs). Finally, assume that changes in a firm's capital/labor ratio are independent
of the rate of change of its capital, and the latter is twice as volatile as the former27. In this case,
the asymptotic bias of the OLS estimate of y is:
a(1-a)(1-r) pun
=4(1+ a/4)(r + a(1 —1)
Thisexpression takes a value equal to 2.3% for r =0.5and -3.3% for r =2.0,very small numbers.
Adding uncertainty respect to r, regardless of whether it is pro- or counter-cyclical, does not change
the order of magnitude of these biases.
27Giventhat capital and labor tend to comove, this seems to be a very conservative assumption.
In fact the asymptotic bias is increasing in the variance of the capital/labor ratio.
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26TABLE 1
HausmanTests:Chi—Square Statistics for Both Types of Test




Significant at the 1% level.
*
:Significant at the 5% level.
TABLE 2
The Extent of Increasing Returns in Aggregate Manufacturing




*Standard errors in parentheses.Figures la and ib: Bias Analysis















Internal vs. External Economies: REsultsforConstrained Model
Eqn (6): dy. =9.dx.+ [de. + dv.]




















*Stda,rd errors in parentheses.TABLE 4: Internal vs External Economiee at the Two—Digit Level
-y (SUR) ,c (SUR) (3SLS) ,c (3SLS
FoodProducts(20) —1.14 0.44 —1.10 0.71
(0.36) (0.06) (0.82) (0.23)
Tobacco Products (21) 0.02 5.24
(0.16) (2.33)
Textile Products (22) 0.49 1.34
(0.18) (0.45)
Apparel (23) 0.51 0.65
(0.09) (0.20)
Wood Products (24) 0.49 . 0.94
(0.11) (0.27)
Furniture (25) 0.98 1.04
(0.06) (0.14)
Paper Products (26) 1.35 1.87
(0.18) (0.49)
PrintingJPublishing (27) 0.33 0.42
(0.17) (0.40)
Chemical Products (28) 0.07 0.36
(0.18) (0.75)
Petroleum Refming (29) —0.32 0.02
(0.16) (0.99)
Rubber/Plastic (30) 0.83 1.26
(0.08) (0.18)
Leather Product3 (31) 1.14 0.14
(0.13) (0.34)
Stone/Clay/Glass (32) 0.17 1.29
(0.09) (0.32)
Primary Metals (33) 1.65 1.82
(0.07) (0.33)
Fabricated Metals (34) 0.67 0.83
(0.06) (0.38)
Machinery (35) 0.95 0.93
(0.05) (0.16)
Electrical Machinery (36) 0.76 1.61
(0.01) (0.21)
Transport Equip. (37) 0.78 0.90
(0.08) (0.24)
Instruments (38) 0.4.8 0.53
(0.09) (0.39)
Misc. Manufacturing (39) 0.32 0.63
(0.13) (0.13)




FoodProducta (201 0.09 0.50 2.89 2.41
(0.39) (0.90) (0.45) (0.98)
Tobacco Products (21) —0.12 4.34 —0.37 0.02
(0.18) (2.28) (0.30) (1.78)
Textile Products (fl) 0.86 2.12 0.73 0.59
(0.18) (0.44) (0.09) (0.18)
ApDarel(23) 0.87 1.02 0.79 0.60
(0.09) (0.22) (0.10) (0.21)
Wood Products (24) 0.77 1.25 0.43 0.28
(0.11) (0.26) (0.08) (0.17)
Furniture (25') 1.24 1.32 0.57 0.41
(0.06) (0.16) (0.06) (0.14)
Pater Products (26) 1.78 2.52 1.33 1.24
(0.18) (0.47) (0.16) (038)
PrintingJPublishing(27) 1.07 1.48 1.57 1.50
(0.14) (0.39) (0.25) (0.55)
Chemical Products (28) 0.53 1.65 1.23 1.05
(0.19) (0.88) (0.28) (0.68)
Petroleum RefminE (29) —0.25 —1.43 0.13 —1.49
(0.14) (1.13) (0.34) (1.14)
Rubber/Plastic (30) 0.98 1.59 0.57 0.48
(0.08) (0.21) (0.04) (0.11)
Leather Products (31) 1.34 0.47 0.67 0.57
(0.13) (0.29) (0.12) (0.22)
Stone/Clay/Glass(32) 1.11 1.75 0.93 0.54
(0.10) (0.29) (0.10) (0.29)
Primary Metalz (33) 1.91 2.18 0.65 0.88
(0.08) (0.35) (0.06) (0.26)
Fabricated Metals (34) 0.92 1.64 0.59 1.01
(0.07) (0.54) (0.07) (0.49)
Machinery (35) 1.15 1.31 0.57 0.53
(0.04) (0.13) (0.05) (0.16)
Electrical Machinery (36) 0.95 2.14 0.58 0.63
(0.07) (0.31) (0.04) (0.15)
Transport Equip. (3fl 0.90 0.99 0.43 0.35
(0.10) (0.26) (0.08) (0.15)
Instruments (38) 0.70 1.16 0.60 0.82
(0.09) (0.50) (0.07) (0.45)
Misc. Manufacturing (39) 0.54 1.64 0.92 1.10
(0.15) (0.86) (0.08) (0.27)
*Standard errors in parentheses.